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Deliverable 2.1: Requirements for modelling and ASLan v. 33, 41–58 (2013)Īrmando, A., Carbone, R., Zanetti, L.: Formal modeling and automatic security analysis of two-factor and two-channel authentication protocols. ACM Press (2008)Īrmando, A., Carbone, R., Compagna, L., Cuéllar, J., Pellegrino, G., Sorniotti, A.: An authentication flaw in browser-based single sign-on protocols: impact and remediations. (eds.), Proceedings ACM Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering. IEEE Computer Society (2007)Īrmando, A., Carbone, R., Compagna, L., Cuéllar, J., Tobarra, L.: Formal analysis of SAML 2.0 Web browser single sign-on: breaking the SAML-based single sign-on for google apps. In: 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). 497–498 (2013)Īrmando, A., Carbone, R., Compagna, L.: LTL model checking for security protocols. Viganò, L.: The SPaCIoS project: secure provision and consumption in the internet of services. 260–269, ACM Press, Chicago (2010)Īrmando, A., Arsac, W., Avanesov, T., Barletta, M., Calvi, A., Cappai, A., Carbone, R., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuéllar, J., Erzse, G., Frau, S., Minea, M., Mödersheim, S., Oheimb, D., Pellegrino, G., Ponta, S.E., Rocchetto, M., Rusinowitch, M., Torabi Dashti, M., Turuani, M., Viganò, L.: The AVANTSSAR platform for the automated validation of trust and security of service-oriented architectures. In: Proceedings ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS’10). Springer (2005)īortolozzo, M., Centenaro, M., Focardi, R., Steel, G.: Attacking and fixing PKCS#11 security tokens.
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C., Kouchnarenko, O., Mantovani, J., Mödersheim, S., von Oheimb, D., Rusinowitch, M., Santiago, J., Turuani, M., Viganò, L., Vigneron, L.: The AVISPA Tool for the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications.
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82–96 (2001)Īrmando, A., Basin, D., Boichut, Y., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J., Hankes Drielsma, P., Heám, P. In: Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW). 4(30), 181–208 (2004)īlanchet, B.: An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on Prolog rules. Springer (2006)īasin, D., Mödersheim, S., Viganò, L.: OFMC: A symbolic model-checker for security protocols. Turuani, M.: The CL-Atse protocol analyser.
#CARDOS API TRENTO VERIFICATION#
In: Proceedings International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification (CAV 2002). Addison-Wesley Professional, Boston (2003)Ĭimatti, A., Clarke, E., Giunchiglia, E., Giunchiglia, F., Pistore, M., Roveri, M., Sebastiani, R., Tacchella, A.: NuSMV Version 2: An opensource tool for symbolic model checking. Holzmann, Gerard: The Spin Model Checker: Primer and Reference Manual, 1st edn. In: Proceedings European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Springer (1999)Īrmando, A., Compagna, L.: SATMC: a SAT-based model checker for security protocols. Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco (1996)īiere, A., Cimatti, A., Clarke, E., Zhu, Y.: Symbolic model checking without BDDs. (eds.) KR’96: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pp. Kautz, H., McAllester, H., Selman, B.: Encoding plans in propositional logic. SATMC is integrated and used as back-end in a number of research prototypes (e.g., the AVISPA Tool, Tookan, the SPaCIoS Tool) and industrial-strength tools (e.g., the Security Validator plugin for SAP NetWeaver BPM). SATMC strikes a balance between general purpose model checkers and security protocol analyzers as witnessed by a number of important success stories including the discovery of a serious man-in-the-middle attack on the SAML-based single sign-on (SSO) for Google Apps, an authentication flaw in the SAML 2.0 Web Browser SSO Profile, and a number of attacks on PKCS#11 Security Tokens. SATMC has been successfully applied in a variety of application domains (security protocols, security-sensitive business processes, and cryptographic APIs) and for different purposes (design-time security analysis and security testing). We present SATMC 3.0, a SAT-based bounded model checker for security-critical systems that stems from a successful combination of encoding techniques originally developed for planning with techniques developed for the analysis of reactive systems.